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Measuring Bench Presence: Federal District
Judges in the Courtroom, 2008-2012
Jordan M. Singer* and Hon. William G. Young**
Abstract
In a companion piece, the authors argued for a more comprehensive
model of federal district court productivity that included, among other
things, a measure of each court's capacity and commitment to provide
procedural fairness to litigants. The authors further proposed a new
procedural fairness metric called bench presence, a measure of the time
that district judges spend adjudicating issues in an open forum.
This Article examines real-world bench presence data from the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. On the surface, the
numbers are disappointing for those who view courtroom time as integral
to procedural fairness protections. Specifically, the data reveal a decline
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in total courtroom hours in more than two-thirds of the federal district
courts between FY 2008 and FY 2012, and an overall national decline in
total courtroom hours of more than eight percent during that same period.
But there is encouraging news in the data as well. Strong levels of
bench presence are not restricted to courts of a particular size, circuit, or
docket composition, suggesting that there are no persistent structural
barriers to any district court increasing the amount of time that its judges
spend in the courtroom. In addition, there is only a weak correlation
between a district court's average courtroom hours per judge and its
average time to case disposition, indicating that district courts need not
choose between efficiency and procedural fairness in addressing their
caseloads. Based on these findings, the authors urge judges to increase
courtroom hours in their own districts, and invite scholars and court
administrators to further investigate the potential of the bench presence
metric.
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Think of a trial judge. What image comes to mind?
For most Americans, we strongly suspect that the immediate and
dominant vision of the trial judge is that of a robed figure, on the bench,
in the courtroom. For those not in the legal profession, this image is
likely influenced by a combination of personal contact with the judicial
system and depictions of judges in popular culture.1 But even for those
in the legal profession, who are much more likely to be aware of the
work judges do outside of the courtroom, the instinctive conception of
the trial judge is one presiding in open court.'
This image is pervasive, and with good reason. Like the iconic,
blindfolded Lady Justice,3 the trial judge presiding over an open
courtroom reflects our society's expectation of a fair and impartial
judicial process. The anticipated characteristics of open court
proceedings-solemnity, equal and dignified treatment of all parties,
transparency, neutrality, and the opportunity for citizens to participate-
mirror the procedural fairness guarantees to which American
adjudication aspires. Simply put, the open courtroom symbolizes the
best administration of justice that we as a society know how to provide.
Moreover, there is real substance behind that symbolism. In an
open courtroom, the behaviors and values most closely associated with
fair procedures are on full display. Observers can see for themselves the
degree to which parties are treated impartially and respectfully, view the
presentation of evidence and argument, and assess the trustworthiness of
the decisionmaker. Based on these observations, citizens form
assessments about the degree of procedural fairness afforded to the
parties. These assessments in turn influence citizen beliefs about the
quality of the adjudication the courts provide. Ultimately, those quality
determinations directly shape the courts' social standing, legitimacy,4
and productivity.'
1. E.g., Hon. Jay William Burnett & Catherine Greene Burnett, Ethical Dilemmas
Confronting a Felony Trial Judge: To Remove or Not to Remove Deficient Counsel, 41 S.
TEX. L. REV. 1315, 1322 (2000); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials
Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 689, 690-91 (2004).
2. See Linda E. Carter, Justice and Reconciliation on Trial: Gacaca Proceedings
in Rwanda, 14 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41, 44 (2007).
3. See generally JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE:
INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS
38-90 (2011).
4. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 ARV. L. REV.
1787, 1795-96 (2005).
5. See generally Hon. William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence:
Toward a More Complete Model of Federal District Court Productivity, 118 PENN ST. L.
REv. 55 (2013) [hereinafter Bench Presence].
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Given the ability of open court proceedings to grab hold of the
public imagination and influence public evaluations about the quality of
adjudication and the nature of the courts themselves, one might expect
courtroom time to be closely monitored. And in fact, such time is
carefully tracked in the federal district courts. Each federal district judge
is required to submit a monthly report-previously the paper-based Form
JS-10, now an automated form generated by the courts' J-Net system-to
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO). The judge,
through his or her courtroom deputy clerk, is asked to report the number
of criminal and civil trials over which the judge presided that month, as
well as the total hours the judge spent in trial or attending to other
matters in open court.6 For trials, judges report both the number of
separate trial days and the total number of trial hours, as well as the type
of case and type of trial.7 All other proceedings that "require the
presence of the judge and the parties" are tracked as a separate category,
with the court noting the type of proceeding (arraignment, sentencing,
probation hearing, motion hearing, pretrial conference, etc.) and the
number of total procedural hours spent for each day of the month.8 The
AO then compiles aggregate statistics and makes them available for
internal use.9
These statistics carry enormous potential value. Because many
aspects of procedural fairness in adjudication (such as dignified
treatment of the parties and transparency in the presentation of argument
and evidence) can only be experienced fully in open court, there is an
obvious advantage to understanding how much time judges actually
spend in the courtroom, and under what circumstances they do so. There
is additional benefit to digging even deeper, and understanding the
degree to which courtroom use differs across district courts, as well as
the factors that drive the time allotted to courtroom activity.
To the best of our knowledge, however, the data collected by the
AO have never been comprehensively analyzed, or even made available
to the public as a matter of course. Rather, the Committee on Judicial
Resources has foreclosed the sharing of the data on the ground that it
would be "misunderstood." ' 0  We respectfully disagree with this
assessment. Such a rich source of data, attentively handled, should be an
6. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 167
(2d ed. 2010); FORM JS-10, MONTHLY REPORT OF TRIALS AND OTHER COURT ACTIVITY
[hereinafter FORM JS- 10].
7. See FORM JS-10, supra note 6.
8. See id.
9. See United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 (D. Mass. 2011).
10. Hon. William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing
Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 89 (2006).
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asset to the courts, helping them identify optimal approaches to
conveying procedural fairness. That there is so much to unpack in the
data is only more reason not to delay analysis any longer.
We initiate the process here, by focusing on a simple metric called
bench presence. Bench presence measures the number of hours a federal
district judge spends on the bench, presiding over the adjudication of
issues in an open forum." As we explain in more detail below, bench
presence provides a rough but meaningful proxy for procedural fairness
in adjudication by quantitatively capturing the degree to which the
parties and the public are exposed to the court's practices and procedural
safeguards. Bench presence also creates a useful baseline for more
detailed questions about the administration of procedural justice, both by
illuminating the conditions under which citizens are likely to form
perceptions of procedural fairness, and by providing contextual
background for other, more detailed, procedural fairness analyses. 2
In Part II, we provide a fuller description of bench presence and its
relationship to procedural fairness, adjudicative quality, and district court
productivity. We then set out our methodology for calculating bench
presence on a court-by-court basis.
Part III describes the current state of bench presence in the federal
district courts. For those who believe in the power of the open court, the
immediate situation is discouraging. Courtroom hours are in steady
decline. More than two-thirds of the 94 federal district courts reported
fewer hours in the courtroom in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 than they did four
years earlier. Total courtroom hours nationwide dropped more than eight
percent during that same timeframe. Moreover, during that span, some
district courts averaged fewer than 200 total courtroom hours per judge
per year, the equivalent of less than one hour per judge per day.
At the same time, we can find no reason why the downturn should
be permanent. Over the last five years, several district courts across the
country have increased their courtroom hours. Moreover, a deeper
analysis of the data suggests that per-judge courtroom hours are not
restricted or predetermined by a district court's size, circuit, docket
composition, level of judicial staffing, or commitment to speedy case
resolution. Put another way, there appear to be no structural barriers to
any district significantly and rapidly increasing the amount of time that
its judges spend in open court. The allocation of courtroom time in every
judicial district appears to be well within that district court's control.
Part IV briefly considers how courts, and court researchers, might
move forward in light of these findings. Most immediately, we
11. See Bench Presence, supra note 5, at 58.
12. See id at 94-97.
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recommend that district courts embrace the substantial control they have
over courtroom time, and look for logical opportunities to increase open
court adjudication. Judges and researchers should also work together to
refine the AO's data collection process so that future bench presence data
can be understood and analyzed in greater detail. Finally, continued
development of the bench presence metric should give rise to a more
sophisticated and comprehensive measure of district court productivity-
one that takes into account a court's ability to provide efficiency,
accuracy, and procedural fairness to litigants and the public.
In the end, the data paint a picture in which courtroom time remains
a relatively untapped resource. It need not be that way. We ascertain no
structural impediments to every district court (and every district judge)
spending more time on open court adjudication. Indeed, our analysis
reveals an extraordinary potential to increase public exposure to
procedural fairness in the courtroom. That commitment, of course, must
come from each court and each judge. We hope this Article will
encourage courts to reflect seriously on these opportunities and
obligations.
II. BENCH PRESENCE DEFINED
A. Bench Presence as a Proxy for Procedural Fairness
Procedural justice is essential to the legitimacy of American
adjudication. 3 One reason is instrumental: "fair procedures. .. are
perceived to produce fair outcomes."'14 Studies have repeatedly shown
that even when a final outcome is unpopular or personally detrimental to
a party, it is more likely to be accepted if the parties and the public
believe that the process that led to that outcome was fair.' 5 Conversely,
parties and the public are less likely to accept a case outcome, and are
13. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the
Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 142 (2011); Bench Presence, supra note 5, at 73-
74.
14. Hon. Kevin Burke & Hon. Steve Leben, The Evolution of the Trial Judge from
Counting Case Dispositions to a Commitment to Fairness, 18 WIDENER L.J. 397, 405
(2009).
15. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment
of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights,
43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994) (exploring abortion decisions); Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D.
Casper & Bonnie Fisher, Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role
of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. Sci. 629, 640-41
(1989) (exploring cases involving criminal justice); Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice:




less likely to be respectful of the law and legal authorities in the future, if
they believe that a legal procedure was unfair or unfairly applied. 6
Procedural fairness also matters because of its affective quality: the
opportunity to engage in full and fair procedures confirms our place in
the social groups with which we identify. 17  More specifically, the
opportunity to engage in the accepted procedures of the American civil
and criminal justice systems confirms citizens' identities as valued
members in American society, regardless of the outcome of those
procedures.' 8 Therefore, even if an outcome is recognized as an accurate
application of the relevant law to the relevant facts, it will not sit well
with the public if the affected parties have not had the opportunity to
engage in that "peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of
presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for the decision in [their]
favor."' 9  Of course a fair and accurate outcome matters, but a fair
process remains an independent requirement-perhaps an even more
important one.2° Procedural fairness, then, is seen as a necessary value
both for generating fairer outcomes and for building public confidence in
the judicial system's ability to generate those outcomes.
Researchers have identified four features of legal procedures that
primarily contribute to perceptions about their fairness. The first is the
opportunity for parties to participate in the process and allow their voices
to be heard and acknowledged by the decisionmaker. 21 The chance to
tell one's story almost certainly contributes to the perceived legitimacy
of the final outcome; 22 some have argued that it also contributes to the
16. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REv. 433, 439 (1992)
[hereinafter Tyler, Psychological Consequences].
17. Neil Vidmar, The Origins and Consequences of Procedural Fairness, 15 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 877, 890 (1991).
18. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 231-32 (1988).
19. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353,
364 (1978).
20. See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1988) (holding that
the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment against a defendant who had not
been properly served, even though the defendant conceded that it lacked a meritorious
defense); see also, e.g, Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 49-57 (1976) (emphasizing the process values of
dignity, equality, and tradition).
21. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 13, at 135; Michael S. King, The
Therapeutic Dimension of Judging: The Example of Sentencing, 16 J. JUD. ADMIN. 92, 95
(2006) (discussing the elements of voice ("providing an environment where a person can
present [his or her] case to an attentive tribunal"), validation ("acknowledgement by the
tribunal that the case has been heard and taken into account"), and respect ("whether the
judicial officer takes time to listen to the party")).
22. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 13, at 135.
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actual legitimacy of the outcome.23 Participation is also valued for its
own sake because it gives individuals a chance to make their own
litigation choices.24 Indeed, a variety of studies have shown that people
value the opportunity to speak in adjudicative settings even when they
believe that doing so will have no influence on the final decision.25
The second contributor to perceptions of procedural fairness is
neutrality. Neutrality is closely related to participation and voice:
commentators have noted the psychological benefits that accrue from
being "able to tell [one's] story fully before a decisionmaker who is
perceived as neutral, honest, and attentive., 26  Moreover, neutrality
connects directly to the legitimacy of the courts. As one scholar has
noted, "impartiality is a crucial component of perceived fairness....
[W]hen people assess the procedural fairness of institutions, they are
especially influenced by evidence of even-handedness, factuality, and the
lack of bias or favoritism (neutrality)-in short, by impartiality.,
27
Trustworthiness, the third component of procedural fairness, itself
has two dimensions. Instrumental trust concerns confidence in the
predictability of a judge's actions. To trust a judge is to say, "We have
an implicit agreement that you will treat my case no differently than you
would treat any other similarly situated case.",28 Instrumental trust also
bears heavily on the court's institutional legitimacy. 29  Simply put, if
23. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 280-81
(2004) (arguing that participating in an adjudicative proceeding confers "author[ship]" on
the participant, in that the final outcome is necessarily influenced by the particular
arguments that the litigant puts forward).
24. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty
Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 193, 196 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Rethinking] (arguing
that "[t]he 'day in court' is often invoked in talismanic fashion"); Robert G. Bone,
Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46
VAND. L. REv. 561, 619-20 (1993) [hereinafter Bone, Statistical Adjudication].
25. See Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in
Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REv. 4, 12-13 (2007); Tyler, Psychological Consequences,
supra note 16, at 441; Tyler, Social Justice, supra note 15, at 121.
26. Edward A. Amley, Jr., Note, Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting § 1350
Judgments Abroad, 107 YALE L.J. 2177, 2208-09 (1998) (quoting Naomi Roht-Arriaza,
Punishment, Redress, and Pardon: Theoretical and Psychological Approaches, in
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 13, 21 (Naomi
Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995)).
27. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts:
Legitimacy Theory and "New-Style"Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 59, 60
(2008) (internal citations omitted).
28. See Bench Presence, supra note 5, at 82.
29. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 11 (2003) (noting that "judicial authority might
best be reconceived as a relationship of trust that courts forge with the American
people"); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REv. 361, 387 & tbl.5 (2001) (discussing survey data suggesting
[Vol. 118:2
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people trust the motives of judicial authorities, they are more willing to
participate in the adjudicative process3° and more willing to accept
judicial decisions. 31 A second component of trustworthiness, motive-
based trust, suggests that a judge is trustworthy when people can predict
that his or her actions "will be motivated by a concern for [their]
personal welfare. 32 That is, a judge earns motive-based trust when a
party believes that the judge will make a good-faith effort to help (or at
least not harm) her through the exercise of judicial authority. 33 Both
instrumental and motive-based trust are fostered by openness and
transparency. Courts that are transparent in their decision-making
process,34 and in the reasons given for their decisions, 35 are more likely
to cultivate public trust.36
A final element of procedural fairness is the degree to which every
person in the courtroom is treated with dignity and respect.37 Dignified
treatment enhances the court's legitimacy by showing that every
participant to an adjudicatory proceeding is afforded the basic respect
worthy of all human beings.38 The government's treatment of its citizens
(through the courts or otherwise) has an important role in defining
citizens' views about their value in society, by shaping their feelings of
security and self-respect. 39  Furthermore, in adjudications where
individuals are singled out or where individual liberty or property is at
risk (as in many criminal or administrative matters), litigant participation
and litigant dignity are closely intertwined.40
that "generalization to overall legitimacy judgments does occur and is shaped primarily
by assessments of trustworthiness").
30. John M. Greacen, Social Science Research on "Procedural Justice": What Are
the Implications for Judges and Courts?, JUDGES' J., Winter 2008, at 41, 42.
31. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Ho, TRUST IN THE LAW 74 (2002).
32. Id at 64.
33. Id at 62.
34. See Hon. Jonathan Lippman, William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence Address, 47 FAM. CT. REv. 199, 203 (2009).
35. See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, The Puzzling Non-Consequences of Societal
Distrust of Courts: Explaining the Use of Russian Courts, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 517,
548 (2012) (noting that "some Russian judicial leaders have attributed the public's lack
of confidence in the [Russian] courts to the lack of transparency that has traditionally
characterized th[os]e courts").
36. See Tyler, Social Justice, supra note 15, at 122.
37. See Bench Presence, supra note 5, at 83-84.
38. See Bone, Rethinking, supra note 24, at 202; Bone, Statistical Adjudication,
supra note 24, at 619-20; Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 13, at 139; Solum, supra note
23, at 262-63.
39. Tyler, Psychological Consequences, supra note 16, at 441.
40. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 24, at 619-20; King, supra note
21, at 95.
2013]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
These four dimensions of procedural fairness bear directly on the
perceived quality of adjudication.4' Case outcomes that fail to meet
constitutional or sociological standards of participation, neutrality,
trustworthiness, or dignity are of a lower quality, even if the outcomes
themselves are accurate.42 This effect on quality has a concomitant
effect on the productivity of the trial courts because the productivity of
public services (including court services) is a function of both the quality
of services and the efficiency with which they are provided. 43
Accordingly, diminished perceptions of procedural fairness in
adjudication are associated with diminished perceptions of the overall
quality of adjudication and diminished district court productivity.
Conversely, where confidence in procedural fairness is elevated,
adjudicative quality and court productivity are likely to be elevated as
well. 44
Procedural fairness is not easily measured. However, in the federal
district courts, it is amenable to meaningful approximation through time
spent in open court. Courtroom time is deeply intertwined with
procedural fairness in two distinct ways. First, adjudication in open
court directly enables several core characteristics of procedural fairness,
like participation/voice, transparency, and dignified and equal treatment
of the parties. Even where a judge is wholeheartedly committed to
providing a fair and impartial process, if the parties are not afforded the
opportunity to make their case in an open forum and have their
arguments acknowledged directly by the judge, perceptions of procedural
fairness may not reach their full capacity. Second, open court
adjudication permits public monitoring. When the judge is on the bench,
his or her treatment of the parties and their positions is on full display. A
judge who is committed to treating every party impartially and with
dignity provides a clear exhibition of that commitment in the open
courtroom. Behind the scenes, by contrast, a judge with the same
commitment to procedural justice has fewer opportunities to convey that
he or she is trying to be fair.
We call the time that a judge spends presiding over adjudication of
issues in open court bench presence. Bench presence, of course, is not a
perfect proxy for procedural fairness. Even as it makes possible
dignified and equal treatment of the parties, demonstrations of neutrality
and trustworthiness, and fuller opportunities for participation, it does not
guarantee them. But bench presence does not need to be a perfect
41. See Bench Presence, supra note 5, at 70 (describing procedural fairness as a
necessary component of adjudicative quality).
42. See id at 74-75.




measure to be an extremely useful one. If the qualities associated with
procedural fairness are not present in the courtroom, bench presence at
least allows the parties and the public to make that determination in a
transparent and public setting. Moreover, formally measuring bench
presence would place a value on courtroom activity in a way that always
has been implicit, but never fully explicit. Bench presence, then,
simultaneously enables the qualities of procedural fairness, permits for
their continued review and inspection, and declares the district courts'
commitment to public adjudication.
B. Calculating Bench Presence
In its most basic form, bench presence accounts for the amount of
time that a judge spends in the open courtroom. While bench presence
might be calculated for individual judges, we focus here on the mean
level of bench presence for judges on an entire district court. We choose
to examine each district court as a unit for several reasons. First, the
level of the individual judge may be too fine-grained to be of much
value: in any given time period, particular judges may experience docket
anomalies which could potentially skew courtroom time, or may not be
on the active bench for a full period. Second, because cases are
randomly assigned within a district after they are filed, court-wide bench
presence levels are more likely to influence a party's decision to file in a
particular district. Finally, analyzing the data at the district court level
makes possible comparisons between districts of the same size,
geography, or docket composition.
1. Data Sources
The AO requires the courtroom deputy clerk for every active district
judge and senior district judge to complete a JS-10 form on a monthly
basis. The first part of the JS-10 form asks the clerk to identify each case
in which a trial was held during that month and to report the total hours
spent in trial on that case during the month to the nearest half-hour.45
The second part of the form asks the clerk to identify the total number of
hours spent on all other "non-trial" proceedings that require the presence
of the judge and the parties.46 The clerk is requested to state the number
of proceedings that the judge held in a variety of categories-
arraignments/pleas, sentencing hearings, motions, pretrial conferences,
and grand jury proceedings-but is not asked to indicate the hours spent
45. FoRM JS-10, supra note 6.
46. Id
20131
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on each category.47 Visiting district judges 48 complete a nearly identical
form, the JS-10A, for the courts in which they provided visiting services
during the relevant time period.
The AO compiles the JS-10 and JS-10A data into composite
spreadsheets every quarter. For purposes of calculating bench presence,
the most important of these spreadsheets is Table T-8, known as the
Total Hours Activity Report. 49 Table T-8 converts data from the JS-10
and JS-10A forms into aggregate statistics on criminal trials and related
courtroom hours, civil trials and related courtroom hours, non-trial
"procedural" hours, and types of procedural events for each district
court.50 Table T-8 itself is not generally distributed to the public, 5'
although some of the data contained in Table T-8 are publicly available
in other forms.
52
Some aspects of the AO data are admittedly out of sync with
ordinary public perceptions. For example, the JS-10 form defines a trial
as any "contested proceeding before a court or jury in which evidence is
introduced,"53 heavily diluting the term's traditional meaning. 4  This
linguistic sleight of hand leads to a significant overcount of actual trials
47. Id.
48. Active and senior district judges may be designated to serve in other districts,
usually where the requesting district faces a judgepower emergency brought on by a
surge in filings, prolonged vacancy, extended illness, or where all resident judges in the
district have recused themselves due to a conflict. JENNIFER EVANS MARSH, THE USE OF
VISITING JUDGES IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES & COURT
PERSONNEL 1 (2003). Statutory provisions concerning the designation of visiting judges
are set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-297 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
49. Table T-8 was designated by the AO as Table R-11 until 2011. The tables are
functionally identical, and we refer to them collectively as Table T-8 here.
50. Specifically, Table T-8 tracks the aggregate number of arraignments, sentencing
hearings, motion hearings, pretrial conferences, grand jury proceedings, and supervised
release hearings conducted by each district court within the relevant time frame. The
hours spent on these proceedings are collectively grouped under the heading of Total
Procedural Hours; there is no breakdown of hours by type of event.
51. The AO makes a variety of statistical tables available to the public as a part of
its annual report. See, e.g., STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR (2012) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2011], available at
http://l.usa.gov/GlVsrq. This public disclosure, however, does not include Table T-8 or
any other table that expressly tracks courtroom hours.
52. See, e.g., Table T-l: Civil and Criminal Trials Completed, by District, During
the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011, in JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2011, supra note
51, at 376-78.
53. FoRM JS-10, supra note 6.
54. See Hon. William G. Young, A Lament for What Was Once and Yet Can Be, 32
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 305, 317 (2009) (noting that the JS-10 definition of "trial"
includes any disputed evidentiary hearing, including a hearing on a motion to suppress, a
Daubert hearing, Markman hearing, sentencing hearing, preliminary injunction hearing,
or separate damages hearing).
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held in the federal district courts-perhaps by as much as one-third.55
The JS-10 form also potentially inflates the number of non-trial hours
spent in the open courtroom by commanding judges to report any case
activity that requires the presence of the judge and the parties, "whether
held in the courtroom or in chambers.
5 6
Still, these formulations do not inhibit the meaningful calculation of
bench presence. Even though the definition of "trial" is overbroad, the
separation of courtroom time into trial hours and procedural hours gives
a general sense of the nature of courtroom activity in each district court.57
And because we do not rely on a count of trials as part of the bench
presence calculation, those figures are of less concern here. The
inclusion of activities held in chambers rather than the courtroom might
be more problematic, in that such proceedings lack the transparency and
public dimension found in open court hearings. At the same time,
however, such events do embrace several of the core dimensions of
procedural fairness, such as party participation, dignity, and
trustworthiness. Because this "weak" form of bench presence shares
more aspects of procedural fairness with open court proceedings than it
does with other judicial tasks, we include it in our general measure, with
the acknowledgement that it is more limited than trial or other open court
proceedings.58 Moreover, the data limitations identified here might be
eliminated over time. Some modest changes in the way JS-10 data are
collected-for example, by separating out actual trials from other
evidentiary hearings, and reporting procedural hours by case type and
actual procedural activity undertaken-would permit a more refined
analysis of bench presence in the future."9
2. Calculation Methodology
Our basic bench presence calculation is a function of two variables:
the total courtroom hours logged in each district during a given period
(TOTALHRS) and the number of active district judges in the district
during the same period (ACTIVEJUDGES). Each district's bench
presence is simply the ratio of its TOTALHRS to its ACTIVEJUDGES.
TOTALHRS reflects the total courtroom hours reported by active
district judges, senior district judges, and visiting judges-that is, any
Article III judge sitting in the capacity of a federal district judge. 60 That
55. Young, supra note 10, at 88.
56. FoRM JS-10, supra note 6.
57. Bench Presence, supra note 5, at 92.
58. Id. at 93.
59. See id; see also infra Part IV.A.2.
60. Hours expended by magistrate judges, special masters, and the like are not
included. The reason for this limitation is primarily practical. Magistrates and others
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figure includes all reported criminal trial hours, civil trial hours, and
procedural hours for each district on Table T-8.61  We make no
distinction between "trial" hours and "procedural" hours for the purpose
of calculating TOTALHRS because the judicial activities and behaviors
that promote perceptions of procedural fairness-such as dignified
treatment, transparency, and neutrality-may be present in any open
court proceeding, not just a trial or evidentiary hearing.
62
We calculate ACTIVEJUDGES by subtracting the number of
vacant judgeship years in a district from the number of congressionally
authorized judgeships in that district during the same 12-month period.63
District court vacancies are typically reported in terms of vacant
judgeship months. 64 We divide that figure by 12 to determine vacant
judgeship years for the district.65  In districts that have experienced no
vacancies during a 12-month period, ACTIVEJUDGES will equal the
number of authorized judgeships. In other districts, the impact of
vacancies is readily observed: in FY 2011, for example, the Southern
District of New York experienced a reported 85.4 vacant judgeship
months,66 the equivalent of more than seven vacant judgeship years.
These vacancies dropped the district's ACTIVEJUDGES from a full
complement of 28 to 20.883-a reduction in judgepower of more than 25
percent.
who are not Article II judges do not complete the JS-10 form, so their courtroom data
are not tracked in the same manner as district judges. We recognize that magistrate
judges can-and do--promote procedural fairness in the courtroom through behavior that
is in many ways identical to that of district judges. Perhaps future data collection efforts
will include the courtroom contributions of magistrate judges as well.
61. Despite our reservations about the JS-10 form's definition, for purposes of
explaining and analyzing the JS-10 data, we use the term "trials" in the same manner as
the AO.
62. One of us has previously sliced the JS-10 data somewhat differently, examining
individual district's relative rankings with respect to trials, trial hours, and procedural
hours. See United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 (D. Mass. 2011)
(Young, J.).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (enumerating the authorized judgeships
for each federal district court contained within each state, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico); 48 U.S.C. § 1424b (2006) (same for Guam); 48 U.S.C. § 1614 (2006)
(same for the Virgin Islands); 48 U.S.C. § 1821 (2006) (same for the Northern Mariana
Islands).
64. See generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, NATIONAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE,
http://l.usa.gov/1 ipFOcc (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) [hereinafter 2012 NATIONAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD PROFILE].
65. By way of example, the District of Colorado has a reported 23.0 vacant judge
months for the 12-month period of FY 2009. See id. at 79. This translated to 1.917
vacant judge-years. That figure was subtracted from the District of Colorado's seven
authorized judgeships, resulting in 5.083 active judges for FY 2009.
66. Seeid. at 11.
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Dividing a district's TOTALHRS by its ACTIVEJUDGES yields
TOTALHRS/JUDGE, the district's basic measure of bench presence.
This per-judge measure is intended to equalize differences in the size of
judicial districts, allowing for more meaningful comparisons between
small districts with two or three active judges and large districts with 15
or more active judges. It also allows for individual districts to be
compared across time, permitting one to examine the impact (if any) of a
significant change in ACTIVEJUDGES in any given district over a
specific period.
The inclusion of senior and visiting judges' contributions in
TOTALHRS, but not in ACTIVEJUDGES, is intentional. Our interest
here is in measuring the bench presence of each district court as an
organization. Senior judges contribute to bench presence and its
associated effects on procedural fairness in a manner that is
indistinguishable from that of active judges.6 7 Visiting judges similarly
contribute to a court's bench presence with direct courtroom activity in
the district and occasionally through videoconferences that reasonably
68Inldnthcorro horapproximate the courtroom experience. Including the courtroom hours
of senior and visiting judges therefore provides a more complete picture
of the procedural fairness behaviors that a district court displays to
litigants and the public. It is a reflection of the court's overall
commitment to providing an open forum for adjudication, a commitment
that is well within each court's (and each judge's) control.
Unfilled judicial vacancies on a district court, by contrast, are not
within the court's control. A district court's number of authorized
judgeships reflects Congress's assessment of the judgepower needed for
each court to operate at acceptable levels. When an active district judge
dies, resigns, retires, takes senior status, or otherwise leaves the bench,
by definition the court is operating at a suboptimal level of judgepower.
Yet there is no corresponding diminution in the court's docket or the
public's level of expectation. Moreover, the court is powerless to fill the
open judgeship on its own. By taking unfilled vacancies (in some
67. See Hon. Frederic Block, Senior Status: An "Active" Senior Judge Corrects
Some Common Misunderstandings, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 533, 545-46 (2007) (noting at
least one district where senior judges "currently maintain[] on average a larger caseload
than the court's active judges"); Wilfred Feinberg, Senior Judges: A National Resource,
56 BROOK. L. REv. 409, 412 (1990) ("In many districts and circuits, the work of senior
judges has been indispensable to the proper conduct of judicial business. Seniors can be
assigned to sit on a court when there are special problems that can be solved by the
immediate availability of an experienced judge, such as emergencies caused by illness or
by the need to comply with the Speedy Trial Act.").
68. See MARSH, supra note 48, at 15 (noting that while there are no formal
limitations on the types of cases visiting judges may be assigned, "[m]any districts ask
visiting judges to handle trial-ready cases"); id at 23-24 (discussing one approach to
videoconference hearings and trials in the District of Massachusetts).
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instances, stubbornly persistent vacancies) 69 into account, the
ACTIVEJUDGES measure captures the court's judgepower relative to
congressionally determined optimal levels, and assures that district
courts are not punished in a productivity assessment merely because
other branches of government are slow to bring the court's judicial
membership back to authorized levels. In brief, our bench presence
metric rewards courts for adding judgepower creatively, but not for
lacking the judgepower to which they are statutorily entitled.
III. EXAMINING THE DATA
A. The National Decline in Courtroom Hours
We begin by examining the aggregate data for all 94 federal district
courts for the last five fiscal years. One trend is clear: nationally,
courtroom hours are in steady decline. As shown in Figure 1 below, total
courtroom hours fell in every year included in our study, dropping from
over 287,000 hours in FY 2008 to about 263,000 hours in FY 2012.
Stated differently, federal district judges reported spending 24,000 fewer
hours in the courtroom in 2012 than they did in 2008. This overall drop
was reflected at the district court level: 66 of the 94 districts reported
fewer total courtroom hours in FY 2012 than they did in FY 2008. The
drop was also observed in each component of TOTALHRS: national
criminal trial hours fell approximately 13 percent, and national civil trial
hours and procedural hours each fell more than six percent. The steepest
drop during the study period came between FY 2009 and FY 2010, when
TOTALHRS plunged by nearly 10,000 hours nationwide.
69. On the recent vacancy crisis, see RUSSELL R. WHEELER, JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS
AND CONFIRMATIONS AFTER THREE YEARS-WHERE Do THINGS STAND? (Jan. 13, 2012),
available at http://bit.ly/193on4R.
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FIGURE 1. Criminal trial hours, Civil trial hours,
Procedural hours, and Total hours by Year,
All Federal District Courts, FY 2008-2012
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The national decline in courtroom hours was also reflected in per-
judge bench presence measures. As shown in Table 1 below, the mean
yearly national TOTALHRS/JUDGE fell substantially between FY 2010
and FY 2012 after slow growth the previous two years. The steepness of
the recent drop is notable: from 2008 to 2011, the mean
TOTALHRS/JUDGE never fell below 444 hours per judge, but in 2012
it declined to just over 430 hours per judge. Assuming ordinary
workweeks and vacation schedules, 430 hours per year translates to less
than two hours per day on the bench.7° Increasingly, the business of the
U.S. district courts is taking place behind closed doors.7'
70. We assume here a 40-hour workweek with normal federal holidays and three
weeks for vacation each calendar year. This translates to about 230 courthouse days a
year.
71. See generally Brock D. Hornby, The Business of the US. District Courts, 10
GREEN BAG2d 453 (2007).
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TABLE 1. Mean hours per judge for




YEAR(S) TRIAL HRS TRIAL HRS HRS TOTAL
2008 124.50 108.34 213.20 446.04
2009 122.79 110.88 214.38 448.04
2010 119.48 114.43 220.23 454.12
2011 116.88 110.33 217.02 444.23
2012 114.15 106.80 209.54 430.49
2008-2012
(mean per 119.64 110.12 214.82 444.58
year)
One might be tempted to attribute the national decline in courtroom
hours to the loss in judgepower stemming from the recent vacancy crisis.
If each district court had its full complement of authorized judges, the
overall judgepower of the district courts during any 12-month period
72would be 677 judge-years. Due to unfilled vacancies, however, in FY
2008 the number of active judge-years in the district courts was only
643.8. That number fell further to 627.8 judge-years in FY 2009, then
plummeted to 597.7 judge-years in FY 2010 before recovering slightly
(to 598.1 judge-years) in FY 2011. Put another way, in FY 2011 the
federal district courts were operating with nearly 80 fewer active judges
than they were entitled to by statute, and 45 fewer active judges than they
had just three years earlier.
Fewer active judges logically might lead to fewer courtroom hours
because there is less opportunity to place a judge in the courtroom. And
indeed, the persistent decline in TOTALHRS between FY 2008 and FY
2011 mirrors a drop in active judges nationwide during that same period.
But in FY 2012 the trends diverged: TOTALHRS continued to decline
(by almost 2,000 hours from FY 2011 levels), even as the district courts
experienced a considerable increase in the number of active judges. 73 If
the problem were simply one ofjudgepower, some uptick in the national
TOTALHRS figure for FY 2012 would have been realized. The
existence of vacancies is therefore, at best, an incomplete explanation for
the national slide in courtroom time.
72. See 2012 NATIONAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE, supra note 64, at 1 (showing
677 authorized judgeships for the 94 federal districts).
73. Vacancies dropped in FY 2012 to a reported 768 judgeship months, meaning




Even if the cause of declining courtroom hours cannot be easily
identified, the consequences of that decline are evident. First, as
described above, fewer judicial hours in the courtroom translate to fewer
opportunities for the district courts to cultivate and display their
commitment to procedural fairness. Even though judges work inside and
outside the courtroom to provide fair processes and fair outcomes,
without the regular presence of an open forum, many elements of
procedural fairness (including transparency, dignity, and participation)
are severely diminished. A second consequence flows from the first:
because procedural fairness perceptions influence public assessments of
the overall quality of adjudication, fewer courtroom hours may erode
faith in the quality of services that the district courts provide. Third and
again related, because adjudicative quality is an integral component of
court productivity, a decline in courtroom hours may indicate a
concomitant decline in the total productivity of the federal district courts.
These consequences are potentially severe, and therefore warrant
attention.
Fortunately, the AO data also contain some encouraging news for
those committed to stemming the slide of TOTALHRS. While national
numbers continue to fall, in a number of individual districts courtroom
time is alive and well.74 It may be possible to examine these specific
districts to determine why they consistently achieve high levels of bench
presence. Moreover, researchers can take advantage of the wide
variation across districts in per-judge courtroom time to explore the
characteristics of bench presence more fully. Looking at district-level
data, we examine whether bench presence is substantially predetermined
by factors outside of the courts' control, or whether courts (and
individual judges) have the power and flexibility to increase their
courtroom hours on their own. Based on a detailed review of the data,
we find no structural barriers preventing courts from increasing their
bench presence significantly and immediately.
B. Bench Presence at the District Court Level
Bench presence levels, as measured by total courtroom hours per
judge, vary substantially across districts. For the entirety of the five-year
study period, district courts ranged from a low of 192.2 hours per judge
74. One example is the District of Colorado, which made a conscious choice to
increase its bench presence by encouraging the reference of civil cases to magistrate
judges for trial and not simply for settlement conferences. Significantly, this
redeployment of resources did not adversely affect any of the efficiency measures on
which district courts are evaluated. Interview with Hon. Marcia Krieger, Chief Judge,
United States District Court for the District of Colorado (Nov. 2012).
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per year in the Southern District of West Virginia to a high of 735.5
hours per judge per year in the Eastern District of California. Figure 2
shows the distribution of mean TOTALHRS/JUDGE in all 94 districts.
Table 2 sets out the 12 district courts with the highest mean yearly
bench presence during the FY 2008-2012 period. As noted, the Eastern
District of California far outpaced all other districts during this time.
The Eastern District of New York is a distant second, with a mean annual
bench presence of slightly more than 700 total hours per judge per year,
followed by two more districts at about 650 total hours per judge per
year. Table 2 also shows the z-score for each district's mean yearly total
hours per judge, which is a measure of how many standard deviations
that figure is above or below the national mean.
FIGURE 2. Distribution of mean total courtroom hours per judge






Mean TOTALHRS/JUDGE per year
Mean =444.58, Std. Dev. = 112.821, Kurtosis = -0.073, Skewness = 0.363
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TABLE 2. Mean TOTALHRS/JUDGE per year,
FY 2008-2012 (for courts with the highest mean
TOTALHRS/JUDGE per year)
MEAN AUTHORIZED
COURT TOTALtRS/JUDGE Z-SCORE CIRCUIT JUDGES
E.D. Cal. 735.47 2.58 9 6
E.D.N.Y. 705.54 2.31 2 15
S.D. Fla. 658.46 1.90 11 18
S.D.N.Y. 645.25 1.78 2 28
M.D. Tenn. 611.54 1.48 6 4
N.D. Ill. 606.63 1.44 7 22
D. Or. 593.17 1.32 9 6
M.D. Pa. 591.97 1.31 3 6
D. Utah 590.97 1.29 10 5
D. Colo. 582.41 1.22 10 7
W.D.N.Y. 580.65 1.21 2 4
D.P.R. 557.88 1.00 1 7
The top 12 courts in bench presence are otherwise notably diverse.
District courts of all different sizes, located in different circuits, and with
different dockets all demonstrated the capacity and commitment to
regularly adjudicate matters in open courtrooms.
What is responsible for the success of the top bench presence
courts, and why is there variation in bench presence across district courts
more generally? The question is important because if bench presence is
dependent on factors beyond each court's direct control (for example, its
size or the nature of its docket), the ability to directly affect levels of
courtroom time may be more restricted. On the other hand, if bench
presence is not associated with such external considerations, courts
should have more freedom and capability to alter their bench presence
levels as they see fit. As a preliminary examination of this question, we
looked at five structural characteristics of the district courts: (1) court
size; (2) circuit affiliation; (3) weighted caseload; (4) docket
composition; and (5) the nature of the court's judicial staffing.
1. Court Size
In theory, the size of a district court (as measured by the number of
congressionally authorized judgeships) should be largely immaterial to
its level of bench presence because bench presence is determined on a
per-judge basis. Interestingly, however, larger courts as a group clearly
outperformed both small and medium-sized courts. In fact, small courts
as a group were the worst performers. Courts with fewer than five
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authorized judgeships averaged less than 400 TOTALHRS/JUDGE each
year, while courts with five to eight authorized judgeships averaged
about 430 TOTALHRS/JUDGE per year, and courts with more than ten
authorized judgeships averaged more than 470 TOTALHRS/JUDGE per
year. Even when broken down into more precise groupings, larger courts
on average had a considerably higher level of bench presence than their
smaller counterparts. Districts with 15-19 authorized judgeships
averaged a little over 500 TOTALHRS/JUDGE during the study period,
and districts with 22 or more authorized judgeships averaged 528
TOTALHRS/JUDGE-over 100 hours more per judge than in smaller
court groupings.
FIGURE 3. Mean total courtroom hours
per judge by number of authorized
judges per district, FY 2008-2012
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Our analysis showed that one or two outliers were not responsible
for the relatively higher level of bench presence among larger courts.
Larger courts surpassed smaller courts both in median and mean rankings
of TOTALHRS/JUDGE. Indeed, four of the six districts with the highest
levels of bench presence during the FY 2008-2012 time frame-the
Eastern District of New York, Southern District of Florida, Southern
District of New York, and Northern District of Illinois-are among the
largest courts in the country, with at least 15 authorized judgeships each.
Larger courts may have higher levels of bench presence on average
because they can draw from a larger pool of potentially available judges
to hold a hearing or trial. In a district with 15 or more authorized judges,
for example, it is more likely that a judge will be immediately available
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for an emergency hearing or to assist another judge whose trial calendar
is full. By contrast, in a district with two or three authorized judges, it is
less likely that at least one judge will be available at any given time for
hearings or trials. This is a reflection of availability, not collegiality-
although a judge's willingness to "pitch in" by taking on additional
courtroom proceedings when fellow judges are busy would certainly be
expected to drive a district's bench presence even higher. An
alternative-and not inconsistent-explanation is that larger courts tend
to be located in more heavily urban areas, where the relative accessibility
of the courthouse, and perhaps the local legal culture, promote regular
courtroom hearings.
While the trends in court size were unmistakable, we hasten to add
that several districts with six or fewer authorized district judges
nevertheless achieved high levels of bench presence during the study
period. The Eastern District of California, Middle District of Tennessee,
District of Oregon, Middle District of Pennsylvania, District of Utah, and
Western District of New York-all districts with four to six authorized
judges-each had a mean TOTALHRS/JUDGE of more than 100 hours
above the national average for FY 2008-2012.75
The generally stronger bench presence numbers exhibited by larger
courts suggests to us that the availability of a larger pool of judges in a
district can contribute positively to a district's courtroom hours. At the
same time, district size is plainly not dispositive. Smaller courts may not
have access to the same judicial resources as their larger brethren, but
even so, several small courts far exceed the national average for bench
presence.
2. Circuit
We also reviewed mean levels of bench presence by circuit. Here
the Second Circuit clearly stood out, with a yearly mean of more than
610 TOTALHRS/JUDGE across its six district courts. Three of the six
districts in the Second Circuit placed among the top 11 districts
nationally in yearly mean TOTALHRS/JUDGE, and five districts were
in the top 30. We can discern no clear explanation for this strong circuit-
wide performance, other than to note that all of the districts in the Second
Circuit (save the District of Vermont) have been proactive in seeking out
the services of visiting judges, including judges from outside the circuit.
The data trends were far less conclusive for other circuits. The
Seventh Circuit placed second overall in mean yearly
TOTALHRS/JUDGE. However, this figure was skewed by the strong
75. See supra Table 2.
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performance of a single large district, the Northern District of Illinois.
The median national bench presence rank for districts in the Seventh
Circuit was 62. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit had three districts in the top
15 nationally, but also contained some districts with relatively low levels
of bench presence. Other circuits saw similar variability. This suggests
that as a whole, circuit affiliation is not a particularly useful mechanism
for understanding the dynamics of bench presence at a district court
level.
TABLE 3. Mean yearly TOTALHRS/JUDGE and
mean and median district court rank,
FY 2008-2012, by circuit
MEAN
TOTALHRS/ MEAN MEDIAN
NO. OF JUDGE CIRCUIT DIST. DIST.
CIRCUIT DISTRICTS per YEAR RANK RAINK RANK
1 5 427.40 7 57 60
2 6 612.53 1 20.3 17
3 6 459.55 3 30.7 29
4 9 391.18 10 55.8 68
5 9 368.20 11 60.7 66
6 9 456.07 4 40.1 39
7 7 476.07 2 48.3 62
8 10 404.83 9 47.6 47
9 15 446.96 5 43.9 40
10 8 425.88 8 49.4 54
11 9 441.81 6 54.6 54
DC 1 355.09 12 65 65
3. Weighted Caseload
It is well accepted that some types of cases demand more judge time
and court resources than others. Since the 1970s, the federal courts have
assigned weights to each case-type in order to "indicate how much more
or less time-consuming one type of case is compared to other cases.
76
In 2003-2004, the Federal Judicial Center undertook an extensive new
study of federal case weights, which took into account both the types of
events that a judge must complete to process a case, and the amount of
time typically required to accomplish those events.77 The median case
was assigned a weight of 1.00, and all other case types were assigned
76. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 2003-2004 DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING
STUDY 1 (2005).
77. Id. at 1-2.
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weights relative to that weight.7 The weighted caseload of each district
court is now reported each quarter as part of its Federal Court
Management Statistics.79 For the 12 months ending September 2012, the
national average was 520 weighted filings per judge.80 In that same
period, the District of Delaware recorded the highest rate of weighted
filings per judge with 1165 81-more than double the national average.
The District of Wyoming recorded the lowest rate of weighted filings per
judge with 179 82-less than half the national average.83
One might logically expect to see a close relationship between a
court's per-judge weighted caseload and its level of bench presence.
More complex cases are generally assumed to be more time-consuming,
which in turn may necessitate a higher investment of courtroom time.
Our study, however, found only a weak to moderate correlation between
a district court's weighted caseload per judge and TOTALHRS/JUDGE
(r = 0.2816 for FY 2012).84 Indeed, a closer look reveals a number of
districts with high levels of bench presence and a relatively low weighted
caseload per judge, or vice versa. For example, the Eastern District of
Texas, District of Minnesota, Southern District of Illinois, and Middle
District of Florida all placed among the ten courts with the highest mean
annual weighted caseloads per judge during the five-year study period,
yet none of these districts were above the national average for bench
presence in the same period. Conversely, the District of Wyoming and
the Eastern District of Washington ranked 90th and 85th, respectively, in
mean annual weighted caseload per judge during the study period, yet
they were both among the top 15 districts for mean annual bench
presence during the same time period. This suggests that while district
courts may view complex or highly weighted cases as an opportunity to
78. Id at 4.
79. Federal Court Management Statistics reflect courtwide data on caseload and
case processing times. See, e.g., 2012 NATIONAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE, supra
note 64. These statistics do not include data reported on the JS-10 form.
80. Id at I.
81. Id. at 14.
82. Id. at 86.
83. The AO does not calculate weighted filings for three districts: Guam, the Virgin
Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
84. The correlation coefficient r measures the relationship between two variables,
and is expressed as a number between zero (no relationship) and one (a perfect linear
relationship). As r increases, the relationship between the variables grows stronger. A
positive correlation indicates that as one variable increases, the other variable also
increases; a negative correlation indicates that as one variable increases, the other
decreases. See WILLIAM D. BERRY & MITCHELL S. SANDERS, UNDERSTANDING
MULTIVARIATE RESEARCH 10 (2000). Similar correlations to that reported above were
found for FY 2011 (r = 0.3626), FY 2010 (r = 0.3796), FY 2009 (r = 0.3865), and FY
2008 (r = 0.2743). Throughout this Article, the p-value for any Pearson correlation
coefficient r is <0.05 unless otherwise indicated.
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increase courtroom time, a high weighted caseload is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for achieving strong levels of bench presence.
4. Docket Composition
While weighted caseload is intended to capture the overall time-
intensiveness of a court's docket, it does not expressly concern itself with
particular case types. To account for the possibility that specific types of
cases influence bench presence levels, we compared each district's total
hours per judge against the specific composition of its docket for the FY
2008-2012 period. The results paralleled the weighted caseload
analysis, with no particular case types standing out as having a strong
statistical relationship with a district's overall bench presence levels.
Ratio of civil to criminal filings. We began by tracking each
district's ratio of civil to criminal filings. Calculating civil filings is
fairly straightforward: the AO directly reports all civil case filings for
each district, both in the aggregate and broken down into more than 30
case types.85 Calculating the number of criminal filings is slightly more
complex. Until FY 2011, the AO separately reported both the total
number of criminal felony cases filed and the total number of criminal
felony defendants charged in each district court each year, again broken
down by type of felony.86 Beginning October 1, 2011, however, the AO
discontinued most of its reporting tables for felony cases, explaining that
"single-case profiles often do not capture the characteristics and
complexity of multi-defendant cases." 87  In order to maintain the
consistency of the criminal data throughout the five-year study period,
we follow the AO's lead and focus exclusively on felony defendants,
treating each reported felony defendant as a separate filing for purposes
of docket analysis.
Following this methodology, nationally about 74 percent of reported
filings in the federal district courts for FY 2008-2012 involved civil
suits, and about 26 percent of reported filings involved criminal felony
85. See, e.g., Table C-3-Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and District,
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011, in JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2011,
supra note 51, at 131-36. One category of civil cases-habeas corpus petitions by alien
detainees-was separately reported for the first time in 2011. Accordingly, we do not
separately analyze these cases as part of our analysis, although we do include them in our
overall civil case filing totals.
86. See, e.g., Table D-3 Cases-Criminal Cases Commenced, by Offense and
District, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011, in JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2011, supra note 51, at 218-23; Table D-3 Defendants--Criminal Defendants
Commenced, by Offense and District, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30,
2011, in JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2011, supra note 51, at 224-29.
87. Statistics: Judicial Business of the US. District Courts 2012, U.S. Crs.,
http://l.usa.gov/lawzr9q (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
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defendants. There is considerable variation in this breakdown across
courts, with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania having the highest
percentage of civil suits, at 97.6 percent of its docket,88 and the District
of Guam and the Western District of Texas having the lowest percentage
of civil suits, at roughly 25 percent of their overall dockets.89 Ultimately,
however, the ratio of civil filings to criminal felony defendant filings
within a district bore almost no relationship whatsoever to that district's
mean TOTALHRS/JUDGE during the five-year study period. The
correlation between the two variables was a remarkably low 0.00686.90
This strongly suggests that a mere civil/criminal breakdown is not
influential on a district's bench presence levels.
Influence of specific case or felony types. We also examined the
composition of each district court's docket, broken down more finely by
case type. As with districts showing high-weighted caseloads per judge,
we hypothesized that higher numbers of complex or personally sensitive
cases (like homicide, discrimination or personal injury matters) might be
associated with higher levels of bench presence, on the theory that more
court time was necessary and/or desirable in those cases. Accordingly,
we counted the number of civil cases by case type and the number of
criminal defendants by felony type in each district, and converted each
raw number to a percentage of the district's overall docket. 91  For
example, in the District of Delaware, defendants charged with firearms-
related felonies made up over 26 percent of the court's criminal docket,
and private contract disputes made up about eight percent of the court's
civil docket, between FY 2008 and FY 2012. We then examined the
statistical correlation between the percentage of a case type (or defendant
type) on the court's docket and the court's overall TOTALHRS/JUDGE.
In the end, we found only a series of weak correlations, none stronger
than -0.33261 for embezzlement felonies (indicating a weak-to-moderate
inverse correlation with courtroom time) and 0.27824 for the catch-all
civil category of "Other Private Cases."
88. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania's docket was swamped each year of the
study by tens of thousands of new personal injury/product liability filings. See, e.g., 2012
NATIONAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE, supra note 64, at 16.
89. The Western District of Texas experienced very high levels of marijuana and
reentry-related felonies in each year of the study period. See id. at 37.
90. P-value = 0.9476.
91. District-specific data for each year was obtained from Judicial Business of the
U.S. Courts for each year of the study. Reports for FY 2008-2011 are available at
http://l.usa.gov/16i3PVk. The report for FY 2012 was obtained directly from the AO.
The data for each district were entered into a spreadsheet and summed to determine the
composition of each district's composite docket for the five-year study period. Individual
case or felony types were then calculated as a percentage of the composite docket for that
district.
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We also considered the impact of each district's share of the
national total for each case type. Again, as an example, between FY
2008 and FY 2012, the District of Delaware handled 0.4 percent of all
defendants charged nationally with federal firearms-related felonies, and
handled 0.3 percent of all private contract cases filed nationally. 92 And
again, the statistical correlations between a court's national share of a
case type and its overall TOTALHRS/JUDGE were generally weak.
Most case types showed correlations below 0.2, and only three case types
showed a correlation above 0.4: labor cases filed against the U.S.
government (r = 0.41715), prisoner habeas petitions filed against private
parties (r = 0.44004), and the catch-all category of "other violent"
felonies (r = 0.42497). Some case types that might be considered
courtroom-intensive, like civil rights, intellectual property, and homicide,
all had correlations with TOTALHRS/JUDGE at 0.23 or lower.
Our findings here are modest, and we do not discount the possibility
that a combination of more refined data and more sophisticated modeling
might provide further insight into the relationship between bench
presence and docket composition. Our preliminary examination here,
however, finds no clear evidence that a glut or dearth of particular case
types is related to a district court's level of bench presence. As with
weighted caseload, a court's docket composition appears to present
neither a barrier to nor a driving force for courtroom hours.
5. Judicial Staffing
Temporary anomalies in judicial staffing suggest another possible
explanation for variations in bench presence across district courts.
Because bench presence represents the number of courtroom hours
expended by all judges in the district divided by the number of active
district judges in the district, bench presence levels would rise either by
adding courtroom hours from senior judges (increasing the numerator) or
by lowering the number of active judges (decreasing the denominator),
all else being equal. If an active judge takes senior status and the other
branches are slow to fill the vacancy, the effect may be compounded: the
new senior judge contributes to the district's total courtroom hours
without counting as an active judgeship. Accordingly, if during the
study period a district experienced atypically high ratios of senior judges
to active judges or atypically high rates of unfilled vacancies, its
92. District-specific data were obtained and summed in the manner described in
note 91 supra. Individual case or felony types were then calculated as a percentage of the
total number of cases of that type filed nationally during the study period.
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calculated bench presence may be temporarily and abnormally high. We
therefore examined this possibility in more detail.
93
Drawing from biographical data,94 we calculated the number of
district judges with senior status in every district court for each year of
the study period. Judges who took senior status after the start of a fiscal
year or whose senior status terminated by retirement or death before the
end of a fiscal year were counted for the part of the year in which they
had senior status. Most districts had at least one senior judge for each
year of the study; the largest courts often had more than a dozen.
Nationally, in each year of the study there were between 167 and 192
senior judges on the bench, representing about 30 percent of the active
judge total. In many districts, however, that percentage was higher; in
fact, during the aggregate five-year study period, senior judges
outnumbered active judges in 13 district courts.
Even though a much higher than average ratio of senior judges to
active judges might be thought to contribute disproportionately to a
district court's bench presence, we were able to discern no clear trend.
Only four of the top 12 courts in bench presence for FY 2008-2012 were
also among the top 12 in senior judge/active judge ratio. Conversely,
several districts with the highest senior to active judge ratios were below
the national average of 445 TOTALHRS/JUDGE in bench presence.
Moreover, during the aggregate study period, the correlation between a
district's TOTALHRS/JJDGE and its ratio of senior to active judges
was only 0.3792. The availability of more senior judges in a district
contributes to its bench presence, but by itself that availability cannot
satisfactorily explain district-level bench presence variations.
When broken down by individual year, the correlation between the
senior judge/active judge ratio and a court's bench presence level
increased slightly, to around 0.5 for FY 2010, 2011, and 2012. Because
93. Contributions of visiting judges are also included in each district's TOTALHRS
calculation, but we do not separately examine the impact of visiting judges here, for two
reasons. First, the AO only reports the number of visiting judges for each district, and the
number of cases terminated or trials held by the visitors. In addition, visitors handle only
a small percentage of the overall workload of a district court. For each year of the study,
visitors presided over the termination of less than one percent of all civil cases and
criminal defendants nationally. This figure is certainly meaningful to the parties and
courts that benefit from their service, but is negligible in explaining variations in bench
presence levels.
94. The AO does not independently report the number of senior judges in a district
for any given period, but the Federal Judicial Center does provide a database with basic
biographical information on every federal district judge who has served since 1789. See
Export of All Data in the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://l.usa.gov/17tC3WM (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). Using that database, we created a
spreadsheet of every judge who held senior status (as denoted by "Retirement from
Active Service") in any federal district court between October 2007 and September 2012.
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this period represented the height of the recent district court vacancy
crisis, a renewed look at the vacancy rates in individual districts was
warranted. Again, however, we found no meaningful relationship
between a district court's vacancy rate and its level of bench presence.
Indeed, only one of the top 12 bench presence courts-the Middle
District of Pennsylvania-was also among the top ten districts for
percentage of unfilled vacancies during the study period. None of the
top four bench presence courts was even in the top 25 districts for
unfilled vacancy rate.
C. Bench Presence and Case Processing Time
We also explored the relationship between bench presence and case
processing. That relationship is particularly relevant because some
commentators have suggested that time spent in the courtroom
negatively affects a district's overall case-processing speed. This
argument has two forms. First, some have argued that open court
hearings are a clumsy and inefficient way of deciding motions because
many motions can be resolved on the papers alone in less time and with
equal accuracy. 95 Trials-especially jury trials-are argued to be even
greater contributors to delay. 96  If taken seriously, the argument
continues, bench presence would provide incentives for district judges to
waste time in the courtroom on issues that can be dealt with faster
outside the public view. The second argument is related: focusing on
courtroom time is asserted to place an inordinate emphasis on trials and
creates incentives for judges to push cases toward trial, when in fact the
much more efficient resolution for many cases (at least from the point of
docket control and caseflow management) is a plea bargain or civil
settlement.
97
Despite these concerns, one early study of over 1,600 closed civil
cases by the Civil Litigation Research Project at the University of
Wisconsin (CLRP) found "no clear pattern" between the mode of
95. See Mark R. Kravitz, Written and Oral Persuasion in the United States Courts:
A District Judge's Perspective on Their History, Function, and Future, 10 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 247, 255 (2009) (describing, but not endorsing, the "widespread belief among
both court of appeals and district court judges that oral argument is inefficient and
consumes too much court time, without attendant benefit").
96. See Thomas C. Yager, Justice Expedited-A Ten-Year Summary, 7 UCLA L.
REV. 57, 69 (1960).
97. Certainly some within the district courts have taken the view that efficiency
requires a constant judicial push for settlement. See, e.g., Mark R. Kravitz, The
Vanishing Trial: A Problem in Need of a Solution?, 79 CONN. B.1 1, 24-25 (2005). For
an older and rather extreme version of this view, see generally FREDERICK B. LACEY, THE
JUDGE'S ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL SUITS (1977).
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disposition and overall processing time.98 Nor did the CLRP data "reveal
any consistent relationship between the frequency of trials and
comparatively faster disposition times for cases going to trial." 99
Our examination of court data for FY 2008-2012 similarly found no
meaningful relationship between the time judges spend on the bench in a
given district and that district's median time to disposition for civil or
criminal cases.' l° We first looked at the criminal side, comparing a
district's mean criminal trial hours per judge10' against the district's
median time from filing to disposition for felony criminal defendants.
This yielded a very weak negative correlation of -0.0690.102 A parallel
comparison between a district's mean civil trial hours per judge and the
district's median time from filing to disposition for civil cases yielded a
very weak positive correlation of 0.0688.103 Simply put, there is
essentially no statistical relationship between the time a district court
spends presiding over trials or other evidentiary hearings, and the court's
overall time to disposition of those cases.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the absence of a meaningful connection
between courtroom hours and time to resolution. Figure 4 plots each
district court's median time to disposition and mean trial hours per judge
for criminal felony defendants for FY 2012. As shown, districts
spending 50-100 courtroom hours per judge on criminal trials that year
ranged widely in case disposition times, taking anywhere from 4.7
months to 14.7 months to resolve criminal felony cases on average.
Districts averaging 150-200 courtroom hours per judge on criminal trials
in the same year also ranged widely, taking anywhere from 4.6 to 16.6
months to resolve their cases. The absence of any meaningful linear
relationship suggests that there is no inconsistency between spending
many hours in the courtroom and providing swift resolutions to criminal
matters.
98. Joel B. Grossman et al., Measuring the Pace of Civil Litigation in Federal and
State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86, 107 (1981).
99. Id.
100. The AO reports each district's average time from filing to disposition as a
median time in months. See, e.g., 2012 NATIONAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE, supra
note 64, at 1.
101. District judges report their criminal trial hours as a separate component of the
JS-10 form. Recall that criminal "trial" in this context refers to any hearing at which
evidence is adduced.
102. P-value = 0.51.
103. P-value =0.51.
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FIGURE 4. Criminal trial hours/judge versus
median time to disposition for felony defendants,
all district courts, FY 2012
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An examination of civil trial hours yields the same conclusion. As
shown in Figure 5, the median time to resolution for civil cases in most
district courts in FY 2012 hovered between eight and 12 months,
regardless of how many hours the court's judges spent adjudicating civil
trials in the courtroom. The strongest bench presence district spent
almost 400 hours per judge on civil trials and evidentiary hearings in FY
2012, while managing to resolve civil cases in an average of 6.2 months.
Thus, there appears to be no necessary tradeoff between bench presence
and case processing speed. Many courts do well by both measures.
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FIGURE 5. Civil trial hours/judge versus
median time to disposition for civil cases,
all district courts, FY 2012
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Because procedural hours are not divided between civil and
criminal cases in the AO data, we could not include them in Figures 4
and 5. However, procedural hours are plainly important both to a judge's
courtroom time and to the potential impact on case-processing speed.
We therefore attempted a more complete comparison by developing a
composite time to disposition score (accounting for criminal and civil
cases) for each district court. We then compared the composite time to
disposition score to the court's overall levels of bench presence
(including procedural hours). Because criminal and civil times to
disposition are separately reported, we calculated the weighted average
time to disposition for all cases by multiplying the median time to
disposition for civil cases by the percentage of the court's docket that
included civil cases, doing the equivalent calculation for criminal
felonies, and adding the two together. We then compared each district's
weighted time to disposition for all cases in FY 2012 to its
TOTALHRS/JUDGE for FY 2012. The correlation was 0.0869, again a
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FIGURE 6. Total hours/judge versus
weighted median time to disposition for
all civil cases and felony defendants, all
district courts, FY 2012
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The lack of a direct relationship between bench presence and time
to disposition suggests that courts can excel in both areas, and indeed
Figures 4-6 point to a number of courts whose per-judge courtroom
hours are relatively high and median time to disposition relatively low.
Some previous studies, as well as a wealth of anecdotal evidence from
district judges, have similarly concluded that the tradeoff between bench
presence and time to disposition is a false one. For example, one 2009
study of nearly 8000 closed civil cases across eight federal district courts
found that motions on disputed discovery that received an open court
hearing were decided two-and-a-half weeks faster on average than
similar motions with no hearing, an average drop in time of almost 30
percent. 14 The study similarly found that Rule 12 motions subjected to
open court hearings were decided 15 days faster on average than
equivalent motions without hearings, and summary judgment motions
subjected to open court hearings were decided nearly four weeks faster
on average than those without hearings. 105 These findings are consistent
with the reflection of one federal district judge, who wryly explained, "I
104. INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, CIVIL
CASE PROCESSING IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A 21ST CENTURY ANALYSIS 53 &
tbl. 12 (2009) [hereinafter CIVIL CASE PROCESSING].
105. See id at 53-54, 54 tbls.13 & 14.
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do not have enough time to dispense with oral argument.... It makes
me more efficient and more effective.
' 10 6
One reason for this efficiency may be that oral hearings allow the
district judge to focus more precisely on specific arguments or areas of
concern, allowing a decision more readily than if the parties were to
submit several additional rounds of briefing.'0 7 Another reason is that
the judge, after oral argument, may issue a decision from the bench, with
a written opinion or order to follow. This practice deftly balances
efficiency and transparency, by giving the parties immediate notice of
the court's decision while still obligating the court to give written
reasons for that decision at a point in the near future. Furthermore, when
the district judge holds a hearing and offers the parties guidance on the
way he or she is likely to rule, the mere fact of that oral announcement
may influence the timing and likelihood of settlement.'08 The 2009 study
found that in nearly 25 percent of cases in which summary judgment was
denied, the parties settled within 30 days after the motion was decided,
and nearly 40 percent of such cases the parties settled within 90 days
after the motion was decided.10 9 Similar numbers were observed for
court decisions on motions to dismiss.10 This may be because the
court's decision offers the parties valuable information on the perceived
strength of their respective cases, which in turn may promote settlement
without further court involvement.'
The same efficiencies have also been identified when cases proceed
to trial. As Judge Patrick Higgenbotham has observed:
Some critics argue that a jury is an unnecessary source of delay and
expense. Despite claims by eminent jurists that jury trials are an
important, if not the principal, cause of congested court calendars, I
remain unconvinced. My experience both at the bar and on the bench
leave me with precisely the opposite conclusion. The time expended
properly writing findings of fact and conclusions of law, for example,
far exceeds the time consumed by the charge conference."1
2
106. Kravitz, supra note 95, at 269-70 (emphasis added).
107. See Steven S. Gensler & Lee S. Rosenthal, Managing Summary Judgment, 43
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 517, 556-57 (2012).
108. See id. at 548. This approach has been adopted by a number of federal district
judges. Several judges in the Southern District of New York, for example, hold
conferences with parties before summary judgment motions are filed, to offer informal
feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of various claims. See id. at 553-54 (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted).
109. CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 104, at 51-52.
110. See id at 7.
111. Id. at 52.
112. Patrick E. Higgenbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the
Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 55 (1977).
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Several studies lend support to Judge Higgenbotham's experience.
One review of data from all federal district courts found that holding
criminal trials had no significant effect on the time needed to resolve the
case, and that the use of civil trials actually had a significant positive
relationship to efficient case processing. 113 In a 2007 survey by the
Federal Judicial Center regarding the use of courtrooms, 67 percent of
federal district judge respondents said it was "very" important to have
their own courtrooms, 114 and 56 percent said that sharing a courtroom
with another district judge would have a detrimental impact on their own
efficiency.115 Moreover, 90 percent of responding judges who had their
own courtrooms at the time of the study said that sharing a courtroom
would somewhat or greatly compromise their caseload management. 116
Among federal district judges themselves, then, it would seem that ready
access to a courtroom is an important component of efficient case
management.
D. Summing Up
Taken together, our findings strongly suggest that bench presence is
neither static nor predetermined. Structural characteristics of each
district such as size, staffing, and docket composition are at best weakly
correlated to bench presence levels-suggesting that these characteristics
provide no limit or cap on a district's ability to provide ample courtroom
time. Nor is there any requisite tradeoff between bench presence and
efficient case processing time. Rather, courts and individual judges
appear to have significant control over the time they spend in the
courtroom. We explore the consequences of that conclusion below.
IV. NEXT STEPS IN IMPLEMENTATION AND RESEARCH
In this Part, we briefly set out an agenda for continued research on,
and implementation -of, bench presence in the federal district courts. In
the immediate term, there is a need for three concurrent and
complementary projects, requiring leadership from three different
groups. Judges should strive to increase the availability of courtroom
hours in their own districts. Court administrators should work to expand
and refine data collection on courtroom hours so that the contours of
bench presence can be better understood. Finally, scholars should
113. See Robert W. Gillespie, The Production of Court Services: An Analysis of
Scale Effects and Other Factors, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 254 (1976).
114. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE USE OF COURTROOMS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
54 (2008).
115. Id app. 11, tbl.B.8.
116. Id. at 55.
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continue to study the qualities and causes of bench presence. Meaningful
progress on each of these near-term projects will support a larger and
longer-term goal: incorporating a refined bench presence metric into a
broad and comprehensive measure of federal district court productivity.
A. Improving Bench Presence Theory and Practice
1. Increasing Courtroom Hours
For those who believe, as we do, that courtroom time offers
unparalleled opportunities to build public confidence in the court's
procedural fairness guarantees, the national downturn in courtroom hours
is deeply disconcerting. In FY 2012, the federal district courts had more
than 350,000 filings but opened their courtroom doors for only 263,000
hours. Total courtroom hours nationally have plummeted by more than
eight percent over the last five years. Overall levels of bench presence
for FY 2008-2012 are underwhelming, averaging just 430 total hours per
judge per year. Whatever the optimum level of bench presence may be,
it must be higher than what we are currently witnessing.
Courts and individual judges must remind themselves that bench
presence matters. It matters to litigants, who demand an open forum in
which to tell their stories and participate as equals in the adjudicative
process. It matters to the public, for whom the ability to observe
trustworthy and impartial judging still resonates deeply. It matters to
advocates, who seek out opportunities to address a decisionmaker face-
to-face. And it should matter to judges themselves, for whom the open
court represents a chance to demonstrate a public commitment to
procedural justice.
If courtroom hours were significantly affected by factors outside of
a district court's control, calling for judges to increase their bench
presence by their own volition would be folly. Our analysis, however,
has not identified any such factors. Indeed, none of the key structural
characteristics that might be thought to influence a district court's bench
presence-size, circuit, weighted caseload, or docket composition-
appear to bear any particularly strong relation to bench presence. Levels
of judicial staffing seem to be more closely related, but are hardly
dispositive. Furthermore, a court's overall rate of case processing does
not bear any relation to its level of bench presence. While additional
analysis is welcomed, bench presence shortages appear to be well within
the direct power of courts and judges to remedy.
At a minimum, the federal district courts should aim to reverse the
national downturn in courtroom hours and commit themselves to
adjudicating more issues in open court. This does not mean that every
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issue and every case requires courtroom treatment, but rather that judges
should be amenable to hearing more disputes in an open forum. It is true
that district judges expend hundreds of thousands of hours each year
behind the scenes to assure impartiality, even-handedness, and
transparent decisionmaking, but those efforts simply cannot have the
same effect as when they take place in the courtroom. Courtroom time
provides the rich soil for procedural fairness in adjudication to flourish,
by allowing the parties and the public to view directly the judge's efforts
at securing procedural protections.
2. Refining Data Collection
A second practical reform is to collect more detailed data on
courtroom time. Given that the JS-10 form was not originally designed
for a sophisticated bench presence analysis, it does an admirable job of
providing information relevant to that inquiry. Adding even slightly
more specificity in data collection, however, would vastly expand the
analytical possibilities and allow courts and researchers to better
appreciate the dynamics of bench presence. For example, separating
hours spent on actual trials (jury or bench) from hours spent on other
evidentiary hearings would give a more accurate and realistic sense of
the time judges actually spend in trial. Similarly, separating hours spent
adjudicating issues in the courtroom from those spent in chambers would
clarify the degree to which the public is exposed to the procedural
protections of live hearings and conferences. In the same vein,
requesting that procedural hours be broken down by type of procedure
would give a more precise sense of how long judges typically spend on
different types of hearings-a question bearing directly on the
calculation of a judge's (and court's) weighted caseload.
Some effort would be required on the part of court administrators to
improve the existing data collection model, but it need not be
overwhelming. The fact that the JS-10 form is now automated would
make it easier still for the AO (perhaps with the assistance of district
court clerks) to make appropriate adjustments. Individual chambers
would have to parse out the specifics of courtroom time a bit more finely
than before, but in the end we believe that the increased burden would be
minimal in relation to the institutional benefits of such rich data.
3. Understanding Bench Presence
Finally, scholars should seize the opportunity to understand more
fully the causes and characteristics of bench presence. What has
contributed to the recent decline in courtroom hours? What are the
consequences of that decline? How are courtroom hours more generally
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connected to other time and resource demands that are imposed on the
federal district courts? If structural factors are not responsible, why is
courtroom time so variable across districts? Our analysis of the last five
years suggests that variations in bench presence across districts do not
correlate in more than a limited way to structural characteristics outside
of the courts' control. Size, circuit, weighted caseload, docket
composition, and judicial staffing may all play some part, but none
appears even remotely dispositive. Something else must be fueling that
variation.
We suspect that bench presence is driven by the internal culture of
each district court. Court culture has been offered as an explanatory
variable for a variety of other observable court metrics, including the
pace of case processing" l7 and the rate of opinion writing." 8  Other
studies have identified a number of factors that contribute to the culture
of individual courts, including a strong leadership presence from the
chief judge, carefully articulated goals, the ready availability of accurate
information, and strong internal communication. 119 A strong court
culture of open court adjudication might also stem from less articulable
factors, including the simple expectation by the bench and bar that
hearings and trials will be the rule rather than the exception. 120  The
specific factors that create and sustain an ethos of regular courtroom
adjudication are not easily discernible from our raw statistics, but the
issue is plainly worthy of further study. Understanding the extent and
influence of cultural drivers might also open the door to new insights
about the prospect of increasing courtroom time nationally in the future.
Scholars might also pursue research into the characteristics of bench
presence. How does courtroom time influence the routine of each judge,
his or her staff, and the clerk's office? How does courtroom time bear on
public perceptions of each judge and each court? To what extent does
the use of courtroom time differ across courts and judges? These
questions relate not just to quantitative opportunities to promote and
demonstrate procedural fairness, but also to the essence and complexion
of those opportunities in each district court. Such inquiries lie at the
117. See, e.g., THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF
LITIGATION IN URBAN TIAL COURTS 5 (1978); CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 104,
at 72-75; Richard Hoffman & Barry Mahoney, Managing Caseflow in State Intermediate
Appellate Courts: What Mechanisms, Practices, and Procedures Can Work to Reduce
Delay?, 35 IND. L. REV. 467 (2002).
118. See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology,
District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 699 (2007).
119. See Hoffman & Mahoney, supra note 117, at 498-503 (identifying factors).
120. See, e.g., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 104, at 77 (noting the power of
expectations as they relate to the speed of case processing in two federal district courts).
2013]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
intersection of court administration, social psychology, and public
policy, and are ripe for exploration in the coming years.
B. Constructing a More Complete Productivity Measure
Working concurrently and cooperatively, judges, scholars, and court
administrators can rapidly develop bench presence, both in theory and in
practice. While a different group must assume leadership for each of the
projects we describe above, the projects themselves are closely
intertwined and will draw mutual benefit from their parallel
development. Scholarly study of bench presence may suggest to judges
new ways to increase courtroom access. Improvements in data collection
may help judges and scholars to identify more precisely the factors that
correlate and contribute to bench presence. And augmenting courtroom
hours will provide more extensive data for administrators and scholars to
review.
Advancement of these projects also enhances the possibility of one
day measuring district court productivity, a longer-term enterprise that
places bench presence in its fuller context. As we have discussed in
detail elsewhere, the productivity of a district court is a function of its
ability to provide services to the public that are at once efficient,
accurate, and procedurally fair. 12  Because it both reflects and enables
procedural fairness at the district court level, bench presence is an
important component in evaluating the overall quality of adjudication.
As an independent metric, bench presence offers valuable information
about the degree to which parties and the public are directly exposed to
the court's procedural fairness protections. Furthermore, in combination
with measures of accuracy, bench presence may influence citizen
perceptions of the overall quality of adjudication in the federal district
courts. All other things being equal, an adjudicative outcome is likely to
be seen as superior if the process leading to the outcome was transparent,
trustworthy, and dignified rather than poorly justified or mysterious.
The comprehensive measurement of district court productivity is
still in its infancy, both with respect to developing accepted metrics for
all the constituent components of productivity, and with respect to
raising broad awareness and support for productivity measurement.
More refined data, combined with a better understanding of the nature of
bench presence and courtroom activity, will only increase the value of
bench presence as a valuable metric. More importantly, continued
development and awareness of bench presence, and the sense of
121. See Bench Presence, supra note 5, at 75.
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procedural justice that it fosters, will enhance the experience of parties
and the public, and the legitimacy of the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article represents the first quantitative exploration of bench
presence in the federal district courts. The data, collected by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts for Fiscal Years 2008
through 2012, suggest that courtroom time is an underutilized asset in
most district courts. While the top courts averaged more than 700
courtroom hours per active judge each year, the national average was less
than 450 hours per year, with many courts demonstrating significantly
lower levels of courtroom time. By themselves, these initial figures say
nothing about the optimum level of bench presence on a court. However,
the numbers do provide both a baseline for future research and a starting
point for a meaningful discussion about how federal district judges
should be allocating their time between the courtroom and chambers.
From a research perspective, the data create a benchmark for
ongoing examination into the nature and dynamics of judicial time in the
open courtroom. Further study might build on these data by exploring
emerging trends over time, digging deeper into the numbers to seek out
hidden or unexpected influences on bench presence, and examining
districts with sustained high levels of bench presence to determine the
influence (if any) of court culture and local legal culture. Bench
presence might also profitably be used in combination with other
research tools to gain a better measurement of procedural fairness and
productivity in the federal district courts.
Beyond the opportunities for empirical research and measurement,
we hope that the initial bench presence data presented here will spur a
robust discussion of the federal district courts' obligation to provide
courtroom time to parties and the public. If, as our data suggest, there
are no systemic barriers to higher levels of bench presence nationwide, it
is incumbent upon the federal courts to ask themselves whether they are
doing enough to meet their traditional and constitutional obligations to
provide public forums for dispute resolution. This is not an easy
question, but it is a necessary one. Judges, court administrators,
attorneys, and citizens should make their voices heard. The vitality of
the courts' legitimacy and societal role may depend on it.
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